Calvin, Institutes, Vol.2, Part 6
(... continued from part 5)
Chapter 5.
5. The arguments usually alleged in support of free will refuted.
Objections reduced to three principal heads:-I. Four
absurdities advanced by the opponents of the orthodox doctrine
concerning the slavery of the will, stated and refuted, sec. 1-5.
II. The passages of Scripture which they pervert in favour of their
error, reduced to five heads, and explained, sec. 6-15. III. Five
other passages quoted in defence of free will expounded, sec. 16-19.
Sections.
1. Absurd fictions of opponents first refuted, and then certain
passages of Scripture explained. Answer by a negative.
Confirmation of the answer.
2. Another absurdity of Aristotle and Pelagius. Answer by a
distinction. Answer fortified by passages from Augustine, and
supported by the authority of an Apostle.
3. Third absurdity borrowed from the words of Chrysostom. Answer by
a negative.
4. Fourth absurdity urged of old by the Pelagians. Answer from the
works of Augustine. Illustrated by the testimony of our
Saviour. Another answer, which explains the use of
exhortations.
5. A third answer, which contains a fuller explanation of the
second. Objection to the previous answers. Objection refuted.
Summary of the previous answers.
6. First class of arguments which the Neo-Pelagians draw from
Scripture in defence of free will. 1. The Law demands perfect
obedience and therefore God either mocks us, or requires things
which are not in our power. Answer by distinguishing precepts
into three sorts. The first of these considered in this and the
following section.
7. This general argument from the Law of no avail to the patrons of
free will. Promises conjoined with precepts, prove that our sal
vation is to be found in the grace of God. Objection, that the
Law was given to the persons living at the time. Answer,
confirmed by passages from Augustine.
8. A special consideration of the three classes of precepts of no
avail to the defenders of free will. 1. Precepts enjoining us
to turn to God. 2. Precepts which simply speak of the
observance of the Law. 3. Precepts which enjoin us to persevere
in the grace of God.
9. Objection. Answer. Confirmation of the answer from Jeremiah.
Another objection refuted.
10. A second class of arguments in defence of free will drawn from
the promises of God, viz., that the promises which God makes to
those who seek him are vain if it is not in our power to do, or
not do, the thing required. Answer, which explains the use of
promises, and removes the supposed inconsistency.
11. Third class of arguments drawn from the divine upbraidings, -
that it is in vain to upbraid us for evils which it is not in
our power to avoid. Answer. Sinners are condemned by their own
consciences, and, therefore, the divine upbraidings are just.
Moreover, there is a twofold use in these upbraidings. Various
passages of Scripture explained by means of the foregoing
answers.
12. Objection founded on the words of Moses. Refutation by the words
of an Apostle. Confirmation by argument.
13. Fourth class of arguments by the defenders of free will. God
waits to see whether or not sinners will repent; therefore they
can repent. Answer by a dilemma. Passage in Hosea explained.
14. Fifth class of arguments in defence of free will. God and bad
works described as our own, and therefore we are capable of
both. Answer by an exposition, which shows that this argument
is unavailing. Objection drawn from analogy. Answer. The nature
and mode of divine agency in the elect.
15. Conclusion of the answer to the last class of arguments.
16. Third and last division of the chapter discussing certain
passages of Scripture. 1. A passage from Genesis. Its true
meaning explained.
17. 2. Passage from the Epistle to the Romans. Explanation.
Refutation of an objection. Another refutation. A third
refutation from Augustine. 3. A passage from First Corinthians.
Answer to it.
18. 4. A passage from Ecclesiastes. Explanation. Another
explanation.
19. 5. A passage from Luke. Explanation. Allegorical arguments weak.
Another explanation. A third explanation. A fourth from
Augustine. Conclusion and summary of the whole discussion
concerning free will.
1. Enough would seem to have been said on the subject of man's
will, were there not some who endeavour to urge him to his ruin by a
false opinion of liberty, and at the same time, in order to support
their own opinion, assail ours. First, they gather together some
absurd inferences, by which they endeavour to bring odium upon our
doctrine, as if it were abhorrent to common sense, and then they
oppose it with certain passages of Scripture, (infra, sec. 6.) Both
devices we shall dispose of in their order. If sin, say they, is
necessary, it ceases to be sin; if it is voluntary, it may be
avoided. Such, too, were the weapons with which Pelagius assailed
Augustine. But we are unwilling to crush them by the weight of his
name, until we have satisfactorily disposed of the objections
themselves. I deny, therefore, that sin ought to be the less imputed
because it is necessary; and, on the other hand, I deny the
inference, that sin may be avoided because it is voluntary. If any
one will dispute with God, and endeavour to evade his judgement, by
pretending that he could not have done otherwise, the answer already
given is sufficient, that it is owing not to creation, but the
corruption of nature, that man has become the slave of sin, and can
will nothing but evil. For whence that impotence of which the wicked
so readily avail themselves as an excuse, but just because Adam
voluntarily subjected himself to the tyranny of the devil? Hence the
corruption by which we are held bound as with chains, originated in
the first man's revolt from his Maker. If all men are justly held
guilty of this revolt, let them not think themselves excused by a
necessity in which they see the clearest cause of their
condemnation. But this I have fully explained above; and in the case
of the devil himself, have given an example of one who sins not less
voluntarily that he sins necessarily. I have also shown, in the case
of the elect angels, that though their will cannot decline from
good, it does not therefore cease to be will. This Bernard shrewdly
explains when he says, (Serm. 81, in Cantica,) that we are the more
miserable in this, that the necessity is voluntary; and yet this
necessity so binds us who are subject to it, that we are the slaves
of sin, as we have already observed. The second step in the
reasoning is vicious, because it leaps from voluntary to free;
whereas we have proved above, that a thing may be done voluntarily,
though not subject to free choice.
2. They add, that unless virtue and vice proceed from free
choice, it is absurd either to punish man or reward him. Although
this argument is taken from Aristotle, I admit that it is also used
by Chrysostom and Jerome. Jerome, however, does not disguise that it
was familiar to the Pelagians. He even quotes their words, "If grace
acts in us, grace, and not we who do the work, will be crowned,"
(Heron. in Ep. ad Ctesiphont. et Dialog. 1) With regard to
punishment, I answer, that it is properly inflicted on those by whom
the guilt is contracted. What matters it whether you sin with a free
or an enslaved judgement, so long as you sin voluntarily, especially
when man is proved to be a sinner because he is under the bondage of
sin? In regard to the rewards of righteousness, is there any great
absurdity in acknowledging that they depend on the kindness of God
rather than our own merits? How often do we meet in Augustine with
this expression, - "God crowns not our merits but his own gifts; and
the name of reward is given not to what is due to our merits, but to
the recompense of grace previously bestowed?" Some seem to think
there is acuteness in the remark, that there is no place at all for
the mind, if good works do not spring from free will as their proper
source; but in thinking this so very unreasonable they are widely
mistaken. Augustine does not hesitate uniformly to describe as
necessary the very thing which they count it impious to acknowledge.
Thus he asks, "What is human merit? He who came to bestow not due
recompense but free grace, though himself free from sin, and the
giver of freedom, found all men sinners," (Augustin. in Psal. 31.)
Again, "If you are to receive your due, you must be punished. What
then is done? God has not rendered you due punishment, but bestows
upon you unmerited grace. If you wish to be an alien from grace,
boast your merits," (in Psal. 70.) Again, "You are nothing in
yourself, sin is yours, merit God's. Punishment is your due; and
when the reward shall come, God shall crown his own gifts, not your
merits," (Ep. 52.) To the same effect he elsewhere says, (De Verb.
Apostol. Serm. 15,) that grace is not of merit, but merit of grace.
And shortly after he concludes, that God by his gifts anticipates
all our merit, that he may thereby manifest his own merit, and give
what is absolutely free, because he sees nothing in us that can be a
ground of salvation. But why extend the list of quotations, when
similar sentiments are ever and anon recurring in his works? The
abettors of this error would see a still better refutation of it, if
they would attend to the source from which the apostle derives the
glory of the saints, - "Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he
also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he
justified, them he also glorified," (Rom. 8: 30.) On what ground,
then, the apostle being judge, (2 Tim. 4: 8,) are believers crowned?
Because by the mercy of God, not their own exertions, they are
predestinated, called, and justified. Away, then, with the vain
fear, that unless free will stand, there will no longer be any
merit! It is most foolish to take alarm, and recoil from that which
Scripture inculcates. "If thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory
as if thou hadst not received it?" (1 Cor. 4: 7.) You see how every
thing is denied to free will, for the very purpose of leaving no
room for merit. And yet, as the beneficence and liberality of God
are manifold and inexhaustible, the grace which he bestows upon us,
inasmuch as he makes it our own, he recompenses as if the virtuous
acts were our own.
3. But it is added, in terms which seem to be borrowed from
Chrysostom, (Homil. 22, in Genes.,) that if our will possesses not
the power of choosing good or evil, all who are partakers of the
same nature must be alike good or alike bad. A sentiment akin to
this occurs in the work De Vocatione Gentium, (lib. 4 c. 4,) usually
attributed to Ambrose, in which it is argued, that no one would ever
decline from faith, did not the grace of God leave us in a mutable
state. It is strange that such men should have so blundered. How did
it fail to occur to Chrysostom, that it is divine election which
distinguishes among men? We have not the least hesitation to admit
what Paul strenuously maintains, that all, without exception, are
depraved and given over to wickedness; but at the same time we add,
that through the mercy of God all do not continue in wickedness.
Therefore, while we all labour naturally under the same disease,
those only recover health to whom the Lord is pleased to put forth
his healing hand. The others whom, in just judgement, he passes
over, pine and rot away till they are consumed. And this is the only
reason why some persevere to the end, and others, after beginning
their course, fall away. Perseverance is the gift of God, which he
does not lavish promiscuously on all, but imparts to whom he
pleases. If it is asked how the difference arises - why some
steadily persevere, and others prove deficient in steadfastness, we
can give no other reason than that the Lord, by his mighty power,
strengthens and sustains the former, so that they perish not, while
he does not furnish the same assistance to the latter, but leaves
them to be monuments of instability.
4. Still it is insisted, that exhortations are vain, warnings
superfluous, and rebukes absurd, if the sinner possesses not the
power to obey. When similar objections were urged against Augustine,
he was obliged to write his book, De Correptione et Gratia, where he
has fully disposed of them. The substance of his answer to his
opponents is this: "O, man! learn from the precept what you ought to
do; learn from correction, that it is your own fault you have not
the power; and learn in prayer, whence it is that you may receive
the power." Very similar is the argument of his book, De Spiritu et
Litera, in which he shows that God does not measure the precepts of
his law by human strength, but, after ordering what is right, freely
bestows on his elect the power of fulfilling it. The subject,
indeed, does not require a long discussion. For we are not singular
in our doctrine, but have Christ and all his apostles with us. Let
our opponents, then, consider how they are to come off victorious in
a contest which they wage with such antagonists. Christ declares,
"without me ye can do nothing," (John 20: 5.) Does he the less
censure and chastise those who, without him, did wickedly? Does he
the less exhort every man to be intent on good works? How severely
does Paul inveigh against the Corinthians for want of charity, (1
Cor. 3: 3;) and yet at the same time, he prays that charity may be
given them by the Lord. In the Epistle to the Romans, he declares
that "it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of
God that showeth mercy," (Rom. 9: 16.) Still he ceases not to warn,
exhort, and rebuke them. Why then do they not expostulate with God
for making sport with men, by demanding of them things which he
alone can give, and chastising them for faults committed through
want of his grace? Why do they not admonish Paul to spare those who
have it not in their power to will or to run, unless the mercy of
God, which has forsaken them, precede? As if the doctrine were not
founded on the strongest reason - reason which no serious inquirer
can fail to perceive. The extent to which doctrine, and exhortation,
and rebuke, are in themselves able to change the mind, is indicated
by Paul when he says, "Neither is he that planteth any thing,
neither he that watereth; but God that giveth the increase," (1 Cor
3: 7 ) in like manner, we see that Moses delivers the precepts of
the Law under a heavy sanction, and that the prophets strongly urge
and threaten transgressors though they at the same time confess,
that men are wise only when an understanding heart is given them;
that it is the proper work of God to circumcise the heart, and to
change it from stone into flesh; to write his law on their inward
parts; in short, to renew souls so as to give efficacy to doctrine
5. What purpose, then, is served by exhortations? It is this:
As the wicked, with obstinate heart, despise them, they will be a
testimony against them when they stand at the judgement-seat of God;
nay, they even now strike and lash their consciences. For, however
they may petulantly deride, they cannot disapprove them. But what,
you will ask, can a miserable mortal do, when softness of heart,
which is necessary to obedience, is denied him? I ask, in reply, Why
have recourse to evasion, since hardness of heart cannot be imputed
to any but the sinner himself? The ungodly, though they would gladly
evade the divine admonitions, are forced, whether they will or not,
to feel their power. But their chief use is to be seen in the case
of believers, in whom the Lord, while he always acts by his Spirit,
also omits not the instrumentality of his word, but employs it, and
not without effect. Let this, then, be a standing truth, that the
whole strength of the godly consists in the grace of God, according
to the words of the prophet, "I will give them one heart, and I will
put a new spirit within you; and I will take the stony heart out of
their flesh, and will give them an heart of flesh, that they may
walk in my statutes," (Ezek. 11: 19, 20.) But it will be asked, why
are they now admonished of their duty, and not rather left to the
guidance of the Spirit? Why are they urged with exhortations when
they cannot hasten any faster than the Spirit impels them? and why
are they chastised, if at any time they go astray, seeing that this
is caused by the necessary infirmity of the flesh? "O, man! who art
thou that replies against God?" If, in order to prepare us for the
grace which enables us to obey exhortation, God sees meet to employ
exhortation, what is there in such an arrangement for you to carp
and scoff at? Had exhortations and reprimands no other profit with
the godly than to convince them of sin, they could not be deemed
altogether useless. Now, when, by the Spirit of God acting within,
they have the effect of inflaming their desire of good, of arousing
them from lethargy, of destroying the pleasure and honeyed sweetness
of sin, making it hateful and loathsome, who will presume to cavil
at them as superfluous?
Should any one wish a clearer reply, let him take the
following: - God works in his elect in two ways: inwardly, by his
Spirit; outwardly, by his Word. By his Spirit illuminating their
minds, and training their hearts to the practice of righteousness,
he makes them new creatures, while, by his Word, he stimulates them
to long and seek for this renovation. In both, he exerts the might
of his hand in proportion to the measure in which he dispenses them.
The Word, when addressed to the reprobate, though not effectual for
their amendment, has another use. It urges their consciences now,
and will render them more inexcusable on the day of judgement. Thus,
our Saviour, while declaring that none can come to him but those
whom the Father draws, and that the elect come after they have heard
and learned of the Father, (John 6: 44, 45,) does not lay aside the
office of teacher, but carefully invites those who must be taught
inwardly by the Spirit before they can make any profit. The
reprobate, again, are admonished by Paul, that the doctrine is not
in vain; because, while it is in them a savour of death unto death,
it is still a sweet savour unto God, (2 Cor. 2: 16.)
6. The enemies of this doctrine are at great pains in
collecting passages of Scripture, as if, unable to accomplish any
thing by their weight, they were to overwhelm us by their number.
But as in battle, when it is come to close quarters, an unwarlike
multitude, how great soever the pomp and show they make, give way
after a few blows, and take to flight, so we shall have little
difficulty here in disposing of our opponents and their host. All
the passages which they pervert in opposing us are very similar in
their import; and hence, when they are arranged under their proper
heads, one answer will suffice for several; it is not necessary to
give a separate consideration to each. Precepts seem to be regarded
as their stronghold. These they think so accommodated to our
abilities, as to make it follow as a matter of course, that whatever
they enjoin we are able to perform. Accordingly, they run over all
the precepts, and by them fix the measure of our power. For, say
they, when God enjoins meekness, submission, love, chastity, piety,
and holiness, and when he forbids anger, pride, theft, uncleanness,
idolatry, and the like, he either mocks us, or only requires things
which are in our power.
All the precepts which they thus heap together may be divided
into three classes. Some enjoin a first conversion unto God, others
speak simply of the observance of the law, and others inculcate
perseverance in the grace which has been received. We shall first
treat of precepts in general, and then proceed to consider each
separate class. That the abilities of man are equal to the precepts
of the divine law, has long been a common idea, and has some show of
plausibility. It is founded, however, on the grossest ignorance of
the law. Those who deem it a kind of sacrilege to say, that the
observance of the law is impossible, insist, as their strongest
argument, that, if it is so, the Law has been given in vain, (infra,
Chap. 7 sec. 5.) For they speak just as if Paul had never said
anything about the Law. But what, pray, is meant by saying, that the
Law "was added because of transgressions;" "by the law is the
knowledge of sin;" "I had not known sin but by the law;" "the law
entered that the offence might abound?" (Gal. 3: 19; Rom. 3: 20; 7:
7; 5: 20.) Is it meant that the Law was to be limited to our
strength, lest it should be given in vain? Is it not rather meant
that it was placed far above us, in order to convince us of our
utter feebleness? Paul indeed declares, that charity is the end and
fulfilling of the Law, (1 Tim. 1: 5.) But when he prays that the
minds of the Thessalonians may be filled with it, he clearly enough
acknowledges that the Law sounds in our ears without profit, if God
do not implant it thoroughly in our hearts, (1 Thess. 3: 12.)
7. I admit, indeed, that if the Scripture taught nothing else
on the subject than that the Law is a rule of life by which we ought
to regulate our pursuits, I should at once assent to their opinion;
but since it carefully and clearly explains that the use of the Law
is manifold, the proper course is to learn from that explanation
what the power of the Law is in man. In regard to the present
question, while it explains what our duty is it teaches that the
power of obeying it is derived from the goodness of God, and it
accordingly urges us to pray that this power may be given us. If
there were merely a command and no promise, it would be necessary to
try whether our strength were sufficient to fulfil the command; but
since promises are annexed, which proclaim not only that aid, but
that our whole power is derived from divine grace, they at the same
time abundantly testify that we are not only unequal to the
observance of the Law, but mere fools in regard to it. Therefore,
let us hear no more of a proportion between our ability and the
divine precepts, as if the Lord had accommodated the standard of
justice which he was to give in the Law to our feeble capacities. We
should rather gather from the promises hove ill provided we are,
having in everything so much need of grace. But say they, Who will
believe that the Lord designed his Law for blocks and stones? There
is no wish to make any one believe this. The ungodly are neither
blocks nor stones, when, taught by the Law that their lusts are
offensive to God, they are proved guilty by their own confession;
nor are the godly blocks or stones, when admonished of their
powerlessness, they take refuge in grace. To this effect are the
pithy sayings of Augustine, "God orders what we cannot do, that we
may know what we ought to ask of him. There is a great utility in
precepts, if all that is given to free will is to do greater honour
to divine grace. Faith acquires what the Law requires; nay, the Law
requires, in order that faith may acquire what is thus required;
nay, more, God demands of us faith itself, and finds not what he
thus demands, until by giving he makes it possible to find it."
Again, he says, "Let God give what he orders, and order what he
wills."
8. This will be more clearly seen by again attending to the
three classes of precepts to which we above referred. Both in the
Law and in the Prophets, God repeatedly calls upon us to turn to
him. But, on the other hand, a prophet exclaims, "Turn thou me, and
I shall be turned; for thou art the Lord my God. Surely after that I
was turned, I repented." He orders us to circumcise the foreskins of
our hearts; but Moses declares, that that circumcision is made by
his own hand. In many passages he demands a new heart, but in others
he declares that he gives it. As Augustine says, "What God promises,
we ourselves do not through choice or nature, but he himself does by
grace." The same observation is made, when, in enumerating the rules
of Tichonius, he states the third in effect to be - that we
distinguish carefully between the Law and the promises, or between
the commands and grace, (Augustin. de Doctrine Christiana, lib. 3.)
Let them now go and gather from precepts what man's power of
obedience is, when they would destroy the divine grace by which the
precepts themselves are accomplished. The precepts of the second
class are simply those which enjoin us to worship God, to obey and
adhere to his will, to do his pleasure, and follow his teaching. But
innumerable passages testify that every degree of purity, piety,
holiness, and justices which we possess, is his gift. Of the third
class of precepts is the exhortation of Paul and Barnabas to the
proselytes, as recorded by Luke; they "persuaded them to continue in
the grace of God," (Acts 13: 43.) But the source from which this
power of continuance must be sought is elsewhere explained by Paul,
when he says, "Finally, my brethren, be strong in the Lord," (Eph.
6: 10.) In another passage he says, "Grieve not the Holy Spirit of
God, whereby ye are sealed unto the day of redemption," (Eph. 4:
30.) But as the thing here enjoined could not be performed by man,
he prays in behalf of the Thessalonians, that God would count them
"worthy of this calling, and fulfil all the good pleasure of his
goodness, and the work of faith with power," (2 Thess. 1: 11.) In
the same way, in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, when
treating of alms, he repeatedly commends their good and pious
inclination. A little farther on, however, he exclaims, "Thanks be
to God, which put the same earnest care into the heart of Titus for
you. For indeed he accepted the exhortation," (2 Cor. 8: 16, 17.) If
Titus could not even perform the office of being a mouth to exhort
others, except in so far as God suggested, how could the others have
been voluntary agents in acting, if the Lord Jesus had not directed
their hearts?
9. Some, who would be thought more acute, endeavour to evade
all these passages, by the quibble, that there is nothing to hinder
us from contributing our part, while God, at the same time, supplies
our deficiencies. They, moreover, adduce passages from the Prophets,
in which the work of our conversion seems to be shared between God
and ourselves; "Turn ye unto me, saith the Lord of hosts, and I will
turn unto you, saith the Lord of hosts," (Zech. 1: 3.) The kind of
assistance which God gives us has been shown above, (sect. 7, 8,)
and need not now be repeated. One thing only I ask to be conceded to
me, that it is vain to think we have a power of fulfilling the Law,
merely because we are enjoined to obey it. Since, in order to our
fulfilling the divine precepts, the grace of the Lawgiver is both
necessary, and has been promised to us, this much at least is clear,
that more is demanded of us than we are able to pay. Nor can any
cavil evade the declaration in Jeremiah, that the covenant which God
made with his ancient people was broken, because it was only of the
letter - that to make it effectual, it was necessary for the Spirit
to interpose and train the heart to obedience, (Jer. 31: 32.) The
opinion we now combat is not aided by the words, "Turn unto me, and
I will turn unto you." The turning there spoken of is not that by
which God renews the heart unto repentance; but that in which, by
bestowing prosperity, he manifests his kindness and favour, just in
the same way as he sometimes expresses his displeasure by sending
adversity. The people complaining under the many calamities which
befell them, that they were forsaken by God, he answers, that his
kindness would not fail them, if they would return to a right
course, and to himself, the standard of righteousness. The passage,
therefore, is wrested from its proper meaning when it is made to
countenance the idea that the work of conversion is divided between
God and man, (supra, Chap. 2 sec. 27.) We have only glanced briefly
at this subject, as the proper place for it will occur when we come
to treat of the Law, (Chap. 7 sec. 2 and 3.)
10. The second class of objections is akin to the former. They
allege the promises in which the Lord makes a paction with our will.
Such are the following: "Seek good, and not evil, that ye may live,"
(Amos 5: 14.) "If ye be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the good
of the land: but if ye refuse and rebel, ye shall be devoured with
the sword; for the mouth of the Lord has spoken it," (Isaiah 1: 19,
20.) "If thou wilt put away thine abominations out of my sight, then
thou shalt not remove," (Jer. 4: 1.) "It shall come to pass, if thou
shalt hearken diligently unto the voice of the Lord thy God, to
observe and do all the commandments which I command thee this days
that the Lord thy God will set thee on high above all nations of the
earth," (Deut. 28: 1.) There are other similar passages, (Lev. 26:
3, &c.) They think that the blessings contained in these promises
are offered to our will absurdly and in mockery, if it is not in our
power to secure or reject them. It is, indeed, an easy matter to
indulge in declamatory complaint on this subject, to say that we are
cruelly mocked by the Lord, when he declares that his kindness
depends on our wills if we are not masters of our wills - that it
would be a strange liberality on the part of God to set his
blessings before us, while we have no power of enjoying them, - a
strange certainty of promises, which, to prevent their ever being
fulfilled, are made to depend on an impossibility. Of promises of
this description, which have a condition annexed to them, we shall
elsewhere speak, and make it plain that there is nothing absurd in
the impossible fulfilment of them. In regard to the matter in hand,
I deny that God cruelly mocks us when he invites us to merit
blessings which he knows we are altogether unable to merit. The
promises being offered alike to believers and to the ungodly, have
their use in regard to both. As God by his precepts stings the
consciences of the ungodly, so as to prevent them from enjoying
their sins while they have no remembrance of his judgements, so, in
his promises, he in a manner takes them to witness how unworthy they
are of his kindness. Who can deny that it is most just and most
becoming in God to do good to those who worship him, and to punish
with due severity those who despise his majesty? God, therefore,
proceeds in due order, when, though the wicked are bound by the
fetters of sin, he lays down the law in his promises, that he will
do them good only if they depart from their wickedness. This would
be right, though His only object were to let them understand that
they are deservedly excluded from the favour due to his true
worshipers. On the other hand, as he desires by all means to stir up
believers to supplicate his grace, it surely should not seem strange
that he attempts to accomplish by promises the same thing which, as
we have shown, he to their great benefit accomplishes by means of
precepts. Being taught by precepts what the will of God is, we are
reminded of our wretchedness in being so completely at variance with
that will, and, at the same time, are stimulated to invoke the aid
of the Spirit to guide us into the right path. But as our indolence
is not sufficiently aroused by precepts, promises are added, that
they may attract us by their sweetness, and produce a feeling of
love for the precept. The greater our desire of righteousness, the
greater will be our earnestness to obtain the grace of God. And thus
it is, that in the protestations, "if we be willing", "if thou shalt
hearken", the Lord neither attributes to us a full power of willing
and hearkening, nor yet mocks us for our impotence.
11. The third class of objections is not unlike the other two.
For they produce passages in which God upbraids his people for their
ingratitude, intimating that it was not his fault that they did not
obtain all kinds of favour from his indulgence. Of such passages,
the following are examples: "The Amalekites and the Canaanites are
before you, and ye shall fall by the sword: because ye are turned
away from the Lord, therefore the Lord will not be with you," (Num.
14: 43.) "Because ye have done all these works, saith the Lord, and
I spake unto you, rising up early and speaking, but ye heard not;
and I called you, but ye answered not; therefore will I do unto this
house, which is called by my name, wherein ye trust, and unto the
place which I gave to you and to your fathers, as I have done to
Shiloh," (Jer. 7: 13, 14.) "They obeyed not thy voice, neither
walked in thy law; they have done nothing of all that thou
commandedst them to do: therefore thou hast caused all this evil to
come upon them," (Jer. 32: 23.) How, they ask, can such upbraiding
be directed against those who have it in their power immediately to
reply, - Prosperity was dear to us: we feared adversity; that we did
not, in order to obtain the one and avoid the other, obey the Lord,
and listen to his voice, is owing to its not being free for us to do
so in consequence of our subjection to the dominion of sin; in vain,
therefore, are we upbraided with evils which it was not in our power
to escape. But to say nothing of the pretext of necessity, which is
but a feeble and flimsy defence of their conduct, can they, I ask,
deny their guilt? If they are held convicted of any fault, the Lord
is not unjust in upbraiding them for having, by their own
perverseness, deprived themselves of the advantages of his kindness.
Let them say, then, whether they can deny that their own will is the
depraved cause of their rebellion. If they find within themselves a
fountain of wickedness, why do they stand declaiming about
extraneous causes, with the view of making it appear that they are
not the authors of their own destruction? If it be true that it is
not for another's faults that sinners are both deprived of the
divine favour, and visited with punishment, there is good reason why
they should hear these rebukes from the mouth of God. If they
obstinately persist in their vices, let them learn in their
calamities to accuse and detest their own wickedness, instead of
charging God with cruelty and injustice. If they have not manifested
docility, let them, under a feeling of disgust at the sins which
they see to be the cause of their misery and ruin, return to the
right path, and, with serious contrition, confess the very thing of
which the Lord by his rebuke reminds them. Of what use those
upbraidings of the prophets above quoted are to believers, appears
from the solemn prayer of Daniel, as given in his ninth chapter. Of
their use in regard to the ungodly, we see an example in the Jews,
to whom Jeremiah was ordered to explain the cause of their miseries,
though the event could not be otherwise than the Lord had foretold.
"Therefore thou shalt speak these words unto them; but they will not
hearken unto thee: thou shalt also call unto them; but they will not
answer thee," (Jer. 7: 27.) Of what use, then, was it to talk to the
deaf? It was, that even against their will they might understand
that what they heard was true, and that it was impious blasphemy to
transfer the blame of their wickedness to God, when it resided in
themselves.
These few explanations will make it very easy for the reader to
disentangle himself from the immense heap of passages (containing
both precepts and reprimands) which the enemies of divine grace are
in the habit of piling up, that they may thereon erect their statue
of free will. The Psalmist upbraids the Jews as "a stubborn and
rebellious generation; a generation that set not their heart
aright," (Psalm 78: 8;) and in another passage, he exhorts the men
of his time, "Harden not your heart," (Psalm 95: 8.) This implies
that the whole blame of the rebellion lies in human depravity. But
it is foolish thence to infer, that the heart, the preparation of
which is from the Lord, may be equally bent in either direction. The
Psalmist says, "I have inclined my heart to perform thy statutes
alway," (Psalm 119: 112;) meaning, that with willing and cheerful
readiness of mind he had devoted himself to God. He does not boast,
however, that he was the author of that disposition, for in the same
psalm he acknowledges it to be the gift of God. We must, therefore,
attend to the admonition of Paul, when he thus addresses believers,
"Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God
which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure,"
(Philip. 2: 12, 13.) He ascribes to them a part in acting that they
may not indulge in carnal sloth, but by enjoining fear and
trembling, he humbles them so as to keep them in remembrance, that
the very thing which they are ordered to do is the proper work of
God - distinctly intimating, that believers act (if I may so speak)
passively in as much as the power is given them from heaven, and
cannot in any way be arrogated to themselves. Accordingly, when
Peter exhorts us to "add to faith virtue," (2 Pet. 1: 5,) he does
not concede to us the possession of a second place, as if we could
do anything separately. He only arouses the sluggishness of our
flesh, by which faith itself is frequently stifled. To the same
effect are the words of Paul. He says, "Quench not the Spirit," (1
Thess. 5: 19;) because a spirit of sloth, if not guarded against, is
ever and anon creeping in upon believers. But should any thence
infer that it is entirely in their own power to foster the offered
light, his ignorance will easily be refuted by the fact, that the
very diligence which Paul enjoins is derived only from God, (2 Cor.
7: 1.) We are often commanded to purge ourselves of all impurity,
though the Spirit claims this as his peculiar office. In fine, that
what properly belongs to God is transferred to us only by way of
concession, is plain from the words of John, "He that is begotten of
God keepeth himself," (1 John 5: 18.) The advocates of free will
fasten upon the expression as if it implied, that we are kept partly
by the power of God, partly by our own, whereas the very keeping of
which the Apostle speaks is itself from heaven. Hence, Christ prays
his Father to keep us from evil, (John 17: 15,) and we know that
believers, in their warfare against Satan, owe their victory to the
armour of God. Accordingly, Peter, after saying, "Ye have purified
your souls in obeying the truth," immediately adds by way of
correction, "through the Spirit," (1 Pet. 1: 22.) In fine, the
nothingness of human strength in the spiritual contest is briefly
shown by John, when he says, that "Whosoever is born of God does not
commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him" (1 John 3: 9.) He
elsewhere gives the reasons "This is the victory that overcometh the
world, even our faith," (1 John 5: 4.)
12. But a passage is produced from the Law of Moses, which
seems very adverse to the view now given. After promulgating the
Law, he takes the people to witness in these terms: "This
commandment which I command thee this day, it is not hidden from
thee, neither is it far off. It is not in heaven, that thou
shouldest say, Who shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it unto
us, that we may hear it, and do it? But the word is very nigh unto
thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it,"
(Deut. 30: 11, 12, 14.) Certainly, if this is to be understood of
mere precepts, I admit that it is of no little importance to the
matter in hand. For, though it were easy to evade the difficulty by
saying, that the thing here treated of is not the observance of the
law, but the facility and readiness of becoming acquainted with it,
some scruple, perhaps, would still remain. The Apostle Paul,
however, no mean interpreter, removes all doubt when he affirms,
that Moses here spoke of the doctrine of the Gospel, (Rom. 10: 8.)
If any one is so refractory as to contend that Paul violently
wrested the words in applying them to the Gospel, though his
hardihood is chargeable with impiety, we are still able,
independently of the authority of the Apostle, to repel the
objection. For, if Moses spoke of precepts merely, he was only
inflating the people with vain confidence. Had they attempted the
observance of the law in their own strength, as a matter in which
they should find no difficulty, what else could have been the result
than to throw them headlong? Where, then, was that easy means of
observing the law, when the only access to it was over a fatal
precipice? Accordingly, nothing is more certain than that under
these words is comprehended the covenant of mercy, which had been
promulgated along with the demands of the law. A few verses before,
he had said, "The Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the
heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart,
and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live," (Deut. 30: 6.)
Therefore, the readiness of which he immediately after speaks was
placed not in the power of man, but in the protection and help of
the Holy Spirit, who mightily performs his own work in our weakness.
The passage, however, is not to be understood of precepts simply,
but rather of the Gospel promises, which, so far from proving any
power in us to fulfil righteousness, utterly disprove it. This is
confirmed by the testimony of Paul, when he observes that the Gospel
holds forth salvation to us, not under the harsh arduous, and
impossible terms on which the law treats with us, (namely, that
those shall obtain it who fulfil all its demands,) but on terms
easy, expeditious, and readily obtained. This passage, therefore,
tends in no degree to establish the freedom of the human will.
13. They are wont also to adduce certain passages in which God
is said occasionally to try men, by withdrawing the assistance of
his grace, and to wait until they turn to him, as in Hosea, "I will
go and return to my place, till they acknowledge their offence, and
seek my face," (Hosea 5: 15.) It were absurd, (say they,) that the
Lord should wait till Israel should seek his face, if their minds
were not flexible, so as to turn in either direction of their own
accord. As if anything were more common in the prophetical writings
than for God to put on the semblance of rejecting and casting off
his people until they reform their lives. But what can our opponents
extract from such threats? If they mean to maintain that a people,
when abandoned by God, are able of themselves to think of turning
unto him, they will do it in the very face of Scripture. On the
other hand, if they admit that divine grace is necessary to
conversion, why do they dispute with us? But while they admit that
grace is so far necessary, they insist on reserving some ability for
man. How do they prove it? Certainly not from this nor any similar
passage; for it is one thing to withdraw from man, and look to what
he will do when thus abandoned and left to himself, and another
thing to assist his powers, (whatever they may be,) in proportion to
their weakness. What, then, it will be asked, is meant by such
expressions? I answer, just the same as if God were to say, Since
nothing is gained by admonishing, exhorting, rebuking this stubborn
people, I will withdraw for a little, and silently leave them to be
afflicted; I shall see whether, after long calamity, any remembrance
of me will return, and induce them to seek my face. But by the
departure of the Lord to a distance is meant the withdrawal of
prophecy. By his waiting to see what men will do is meant that he,
while silent, and in a manner hiding himself, tries them for a
season with various afflictions. Both he does that he may humble us
the more; for we shall sooner be broken than corrected by the
strokes of adversity, unless his Spirit train us to docility.
Moreover, when the Lord, offended and, as it were, fatigued with our
obstinate perverseness, leaves us for a while, (by withdrawing his
word, in which he is wont in some degree to manifest his presence,)
and makes trial of what we will do in his absence, from this it is
erroneously inferred, that there is some power of free will, the
extent of which is to be considered and tried, whereas the only end
which he has in view is to bring us to an acknowledgement of our
utter nothingness.
14. Another objection is founded on a mode of speaking which is
constantly observed both in Scripture and in common discourse. God
works are said to be ours, and we are said to do what is holy and
acceptable to God, just as we are said to commit sin. But if sins
are justly imputed to us, as proceeding from ourselves, for the same
reason (say they) some share must certainly be attributed to us in
works of righteousness. It could not be accordant with reason to
say, that we do those things which we are incapable of doing of our
own motion, God moving us, as if we were stones. These expressions,
therefore, it is said, indicate that while, in the matter of grace,
we give the first place to God, a secondary place must be assigned
to our agency. If the only thing here insisted on were, that good
works are termed ours, I, in my turn, would reply, that the bread
which we ask God to give us is also termed ours. What, then, can be
inferred from the title of possession, but simply that, by the
kindness and free gift of Gods that becomes ours which in other
respects is by no means due to us? Therefore let them either
ridicule the same absurdity in the Lord's Prayer, or let them cease
to regard it as absurd, that good works should be called ours,
though our only property in them is derived from the liberality of
God. But there is something stronger in the fact, that we are often
said in Scripture to worship God, do justice, obey the law, and
follow good works. These being proper offices of the mind and will,
how can they be consistently referred to the Spirit, and, at the
same time, attributed to us, unless there be some concurrence on our
part with the divine agency? This difficulty will be easily disposed
of if we attend to the manner in which the Holy Spirit acts in the
righteous. The similitude with which they invidiously assail us is
foreign to the purpose; for who is so absurd as to imagine that
movement in man differs in nothing from the impulse given to a
stone? Nor can anything of the kind be inferred from our doctrine.
To the natural powers of man we ascribe approving and rejecting,
willing and not willing, striving and resisting, viz., approving
vanity, rejecting solid good, willing evil and not willing good,
striving for wickedness and resisting righteousness. What then does
the Lord do? If he sees meet to employ depravity of this description
as an instrument of his anger, he gives it whatever aim and
direction he pleases, that, by a guilty hand, he may accomplish his
own good work. A wicked man thus serving the power of God, while he
is bent only on following his own lust, can we compare to a stone,
which, driven by an external impulse, is borne along without motion,
or sense, or will of its own? We see how wide the difference is. But
how stands the case with the godly, as to whom chiefly the question
is raised? When God erects his kingdom in them, he, by means of his
Spirit, curbs their will, that it may not follow its natural bent,
and be carried hither and thither by vagrant lusts; bends, frames
trains, and guides it according to the rule of his justice, so as to
incline it to righteousness and holiness, and establishes and
strengthens it by the energy of his Spirit, that it may not stumble
or fall. For which reason Augustine thus expresses himself, (De
Corrept. et Gratia, cap. 2,) "It will be said we are therefore acted
upon, and do not act. Nay, you act and are acted upon, and you then
act well when you are acted upon by one that is good. The Spirit of
God who actuates you is your helper in acting, and bears the name of
helper, because you, too, do something." In the former member of
this sentence, he reminds us that the agency of man is not destroyed
by the motion of the Holy Spirit, because nature furnishes the will
which is guided so as to aspire to good. As to the second member of
the sentence, in which he says that the very idea of help implies
that we also do something, we must not understand it as if he were
attributing to us some independent power of action; but not to
foster a feeling of sloth, he reconciles the agency of God with our
own agency, by saying, that to wish is from nature, to wish well is
from grace. Accordingly, he had said a little before, "Did not God
assist us, we should not only not be able to conquer, but not able
even to fight."
15. Hence it appears that the grace of God (as this name is
used when regeneration is spoken of) is the rule of the Spirit, in
directing and governing the human will. Govern he cannot, without
correcting, reforming, renovating, (hence we say that the beginning
of regeneration consists in the abolition of what is ours;) in like
manner, he cannot govern without moving, impelling, urging, and
restraining. Accordingly, all the actions which are afterwards done
are truly said to be wholly his. Meanwhile, we deny not the truth of
Augustine's doctrine, that the will is not destroyed, but rather
repaired, by grace - the two things being perfectly consistent,
viz., that the human will may be said to be renewed when its
vitiosity and perverseness being corrected, it is conformed to the
true standard of righteousness and that, at the same time, the will
may be said to be made new, being so vitiated and corrupted that its
nature must be entirely changed. There is nothing then to prevent us
from saying, that our will does what the Spirit does in us, although
the will contributes nothing of itself apart from grace. We must,
therefore, remember what we quoted from Augustine, that some men
labour in vain to find in the human will some good quality properly
belonging to it. Any intermixture which men attempt to make by
conjoining the effort of their own will with divine grace is
corruption, just as when unwholesome and muddy water is used to
dilute wine. But though every thing good in the will is entirely
derived from the influence of the Spirit, yet, because we have
naturally an innate power of willing, we are not improperly said to
do the things of which God claims for himself all the praise; first,
because every thing which his kindness produces in us is our own,
(only we must understand that it is not of ourselves;) and,
secondly, because it is our mind, our will, our study which are
guided by him to what is good.
16. The other passages which they gather together from
different quarters will not give much trouble to any person of
tolerable understanding, who pays due attention to the explanations
already given. They adduce the passage of Genesis, "Unto thee shall
be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him," (Gen. 4: 7.) This they
interpret of sin, as if the Lord were promising Cain that the
dominion of sin should not prevail over his mind, if he would labour
in subduing it. We, however, maintain that it is much more agreeable
to the context to understand the words as referring to Abel, it
being there the purpose of God to point out the injustice of the
envy which Cain had conceived against his brother. And this He does
in two ways, by showing, first, that it was vain to think he could,
by means of wickedness, surpass his brother in the favour of God, by
whom nothing is esteemed but righteousness; and, secondly, how
ungrateful he was for the kindness he had already received, in not
being able to bear with a brother who had been subjected to his
authority. But lest it should be thought that we embrace this
interpretation because the other is contrary to our view, let us
grant that God does here speak of sin. If so, his words contain
either an order or a promise. If an order, we have already
demonstrated that this is no proof of man's ability; if a promise,
where is the fulfilment of the promise when Cain yielded to the sin
over which he ought to have prevailed? They will allege a tacit
condition in the promise, as if it were said that he would gain the
victory if he contended. This subterfuge is altogether unavailing.
For, if the dominion spoken of refers to sin, no man can have any
doubt that the form of expression is imperative, declaring not what
we are able, but what it is our duty to do, even if beyond our
ability. Although both the nature of the case, and the rule of
grammatical construction, require that it be regarded as a
comparison between Cain and Abel, we think the only preference given
to the younger brother was, that the elder made himself inferior by
his own wickedness.
17. They appeal, moreover, to the testimony of the Apostle
Paul, because he says, "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him
that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy," (Rom. 9: 15.) From
this they infer, that there is something in will and endeavour,
which, though weak in themselves, still, being mercifully aided by
God, are not without some measure of success. But if they would
attend in sober earnest to the subject there handled by Paul, they
would not so rashly pervert his meaning. I am aware they can quote
Origin and Jerome in support of this exposition. To these I might,
in my turn, oppose Augustine. But it is of no consequence what they
thought, if it is clear what Paul meant. He teaches that salvation
is prepared for those only on whom the Lord is pleased to bestow his
mercy - that ruin and death await all whom he has not chosen. He had
proved the condition of the reprobate by the example of Pharaoh, and
confirmed the certainty of gratuitous election by the passage in
Moses, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy." Thereafter he
concludes, that it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that
runneth, but of God that showeth mercy. If these words are
understood to mean that the will or endeavour are not sufficient,
because unequal to such a task, the Apostle has not used them very
appropriately. We must therefore abandon this absurd mode of
arguing, "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth;"
therefore, there is some will, some running. Paul's meaning is more
simple - there is no will nor running by which we can prepare the
way for our salvation - it is wholly of the divine mercy. He indeed
says nothing more than he says to Titus, when he writes, "After that
the kindness and love of God our Saviour toward man appeared, not by
works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his
mercy he saved us," (Titus 3: 4, 5.) Those who argue that Paul
insinuated there was some will and some running when he said, "It is
not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth," would not allow
me to argue after the same fashion, that we have done some righteous
works, because Paul says that we have attained the divine favour,
"not by works of righteousness which we have done." But if they see
a flaw in this mode of arguing, let them open their eyes, and they
will see that their own mode is not free from a similar fallacy. The
argument which Augustine uses is well founded, "If it is said, 'It
is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth,' because
neither will nor running are sufficient; it may, on the other hand,
be retorted, it is not 'of God that showeth mercy,' because mercy
does not act alone," (August. Ep. 170, ad Vital. See also Enchirid.
ad Laurent. cap. 32.) This second proposition being absurd,
Augustine justly concludes the meaning of the words to be, that
there is no good will in man until it is prepared by the Lord; not
that we ought not to will and run, but that both are produced in us
by God. Some, with equal unskilfulness, wrest the saying of Paul,
"We are labourers together with God," (1 Cor. 3: 9.) There cannot be
a doubt that these words apply to ministers only, who are called
"labourers with God," not from bringing any thing of their own, but
because God makes use of their instrumentality after he has rendered
them fit, and provided them with the necessary endowments.
18. They appeal also to Ecclesiasticus, who is well known to be
a writer of doubtful authority. But, though we might justly decline
his testimony, let us see what he says in support of free will. His
words are, "He himself made man from the beginning, and left him in
the hand of his counsel; If thou wilt, to keep the commandments, and
perform acceptable faithfulness. He has set fire and water before
thee: stretch forth thy hand unto whether thou wilt. Before man is
life and death; and whether him liketh shall be given him,"
(Ecclesiasticus 15: 14-17.) Grant that man received at his creation
a power of acquiring life or death; what, then, if we, on the other
hand, can reply that he has lost it? Assuredly I have no intention
to contradict Solomon, who asserts that "God has made man upright;"
that "they have sought out many inventions," (Eccl. 7: 29.) But
since man, by degenerating, has made shipwreck of himself and all
his blessings, it certainly does not follow, that every thing
attributed to his nature, as originally constituted, applies to it
now when vitiated and degenerate. Therefore, not only to my
opponents, but to the author of Ecclesiasticus himself, (whoever he
may have been,) this is my answer: If you mean to tell man that in
himself there is a power of acquiring salvation, your authority with
us is not so great as, in the least degree, to prejudice the
undoubted word of God; but if only wishing to curb the malignity of
the fleshy which by transferring the blame of its own wickedness to
God, is wont to catch at a vain defence, you say that rectitude was
given to man, in order to make it apparent he was the cause of his
own destruction, I willingly assent. Only agree with me in this,
that it is by his own fault he is stript of the ornaments in which
the Lord at first attired him, and then let us unite in
acknowledging that what he now wants is a physician, and not a
defender.
19. There is nothing more frequent in their mouths than the
parable of the traveller who fell among thieves, and was left half
dead, (Luke 10: 32.) I am aware that it is a common idea with almost
all writers, that under the figure of the traveller is represented
the calamity of the human race. Hence our opponents argue that man
was not so mutilated by the robbery of sin and the devil as not to
preserve some remains of his former endowments; because it is said
he was left half dead. For where is the half living, unless some
portion of right will and reason remain? First, were I to deny that
there is any room for their allegory, what could they say? There can
be no doubt that the Fathers invented it contrary to the genuine
sense of the parable. Allegories ought to be carried no further than
Scripture expressly sanctions: so far are they from forming a
sufficient basis to found doctrines upon. And were I so disposed I
might easily find the means of tearing up this fiction by the roots.
The Word of God leaves no half life to man, but teaches, that, in
regard to life and happiness, he has utterly perished. Paul, when he
speaks of our redemption, says not that the half dead are cured
(Eph. 2: 5, 30; 5: 14) but that those who were dead are raised up.
He does not call upon the half dead to receive the illumination of
Christ, but upon those who are asleep and buried. In the same way
our Lord himself says, "The hour is coming, and now is, when the
dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God," (John 5: 25.) How can
they presume to set up a flimsy allegory in opposition to so many
clear statements? But be it that this allegory is good evidence,
what can they extort out of it? Man is half dead, therefore there is
some soundness in him. True! he has a mind capable of understanding,
though incapable of attaining to heavenly and spiritual wisdom; he
has some discernment of what is honourable; he has some sense of the
Divinity, though he cannot reach the true knowledge of God. But to
what do these amount? They certainly do not refute the doctrine of
Augustine - a doctrine confirmed by the common suffrages even of the
Schoolmen, that after the fall, the free gifts on which salvation
depends were withdrawn, and natural gifts corrupted and defiled,
(supra, chap. 2 sec. 2.) Let it stand, therefore, as an indubitable
truth, which no engines can shake, that the mind of man is so
entirely alienated from the righteousness of God that he cannot
conceive, desire, or design any thing but what is wicked, distorted,
foul, impure, and iniquitous; that his heart is so thoroughly
envenomed by sin that it can breathe out nothing but corruption and
rottenness; that if some men occasionally make a show of goodness,
their mind is ever interwoven with hypocrisy and deceit, their soul
inwardly bound with the fetters of wickedness.
Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Vol. 2, Part 6
(continued in part 7...)
----------------------------------------------------
file: /pub/resources/text/ipb-e/epl-04: cvin2-06.txt
.
